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Background and Objectives
Origins of the Study
WORK on this study began several years ago in response, to two
somewhat conflicting trends in thinking about international mone-
tary and payments problems. There was, on the one hand, a widely
held view that the growth of international liquidity—freely con-
vertible and universally acceptable means of payment for transact-
ing international business and settling balances between countries
—was not assured in sufficient size and regularity to serve the needs
of international trade and the orderly expansion of the world econ-
omy. On the other hand, there was a growing apprehension that
the additional liquidity being generated consisted too largely of
dollars and was too dependent on continuing deficits in the U.S.
balance of payments as a means of supplying additional dollar bal-
ances to foreigners.
There was perhaps a certain contradiction in these two views.
If the addition to foreign holdings of dollars was not excessive in
relation to the presumed secular rise in international liquidity re-
quirements, there need not have been serious grounds for worry
about the chronic U.S. deficit. In the extreme view,1 however, there
was no compromise: to meet liquidity needs solely or mainly by
increasing foreign dollar balances presupposed a chronic payments
deficit by the United States such as to weaken confidence in the
dollar and undermine the system. Coupled with this view was the
belief that the system as it operated was easily subject to abuse, that
it did not impose discipline on the United States comparable to
1. As expressed notably by Robert Triffin in Gold and the Dollar Crisis, New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1960.
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that faced by other countries in deficit, and that the amount of dol-
lars which foreign central banks found themselves compelled to
accept could, and probably would, exceed their needs and wishes.
Under these conditions, there was a need to know more about
the composition, motivation, and growth prospects of foreign hold-
ings of liquid dollar balances. The question refers particularly, of
course, to foreign private holdings, since central banks were obliged
under the prevailing system to absorb any dollars not otherwise.
taken up on the foreign exchange market.
What, then, were the reasons foreign commercial banks, business
enterprises, and individuals chose to hold dollars? What purposes
did they serve? How much growth might reasonably be expected?
How firmly were the dollars held or, conversely, how much of a
threat did the mounting volume of foreign liquid claims pose to the
ability of the United States to defend the exchange value of the
dollar?
In brief, questions of this sort presupposed an analysis in terms
of what has come to be called a portfolio adjustment model. What
were the preference functions of foreign holders of dollars? What
were the key variables? How did the variables move?
Along with the buildup of foreign liquid claims on the United
States came the curious phenomenon of the rapid growth of the
Eurodollar market—a market for borrowing and lending American
dollars operated outside the United States by foreign banks, includ-
ing foreign branches of U.S. banks. What were the reasons for this
development? How did the Eurodollar relate to the American dol-
lar in terms of the functions served by both in international trade
and finance? How did the Eurodollar market relate to flows of
liquid funds to and from the United States? Was the Eurodollar
market in some sense a part of the U.S. payments problem? Did it
mitigate or accentuate the problem?
The original aims of this study, initiated by J. Herbert Furth in
1967, have been overtaken by events, culminating in the confidence
crisis in the spring of 1971, the formal suspension of convertibility
of the dollar in August 1971, and the devaluation of the dollar and
revaluation of other leading. currencies in December 1971, and the
further depreciation of the dollar in February 1973.It is worth
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just as flight-prone as foreign-own.ed dollars, to judge by the size of
unrecorded capital outflows as mirrored in the errors and omissions
item of the U.S. balance of payments. As might have been known
from confidence crises that have afflicted other currencies in earlier
times, this recent experience suggests that countries in basic pay-
ments disequilibrium have to be mindful not only of their liabilities
to, and claims on, other countries but of the potential mobility of
domestic funds as well.2
Though affected by these recent developments, the original aims
of the study nevertheless remain relevant to the evolving world
monetary and payments system. They are pertinent to an under-
standing of the past and to an evaluation of future problems and
prospects. Unfortunately, we are still far from being able to provide
the answers, or to command the data, required of a properly devel-
oped set of portfolio adjustment models. We can go only part way,
throw some light on key issues, and help to frame the questions on
which further research is needed.
Questions to Be Considered
The principal subjects dealt with in this report fall into three cate-
gories, explored in the following three chapters respectively.
First, in Chapter 2, we have found it necessary to review and to
some extent reconstruct the statistical record with respect to foreign
holdings of dollars. As far as foreign balances in the United States
—i.e., American dollars—are concerned, we can be relatively brief.
This is particularly true inasmuch as the U.S. Department of Com-
merce has recently modified the composition and arrangement of its
figures along lines that seemed essential to us when this study was
2.This was, in fact,a major weakness in the "liquidity balance" used by the
Department of Commerce for many years astheprinciple measure of balance
in the U.S. international accounts.It regarded increases in both private and
official liquid dollar assets by foreigners as a potential threat to the exchange
value of the dollar.Consequently according to the "liquidity balance," all in-
creases in foreign holdings of liquid dollar assets tended to increase the U.S. deficit
and vice versa.Logically, however, both U.S. resident and nonresident dollar
holdings can be exchanged for foreign currencies in the exchange market. Hence,
whether an international transaction increases or decreases the vulnerability of the
dollar to depreciation in the exchange market is not a proper criterion for the selec-
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undertaken. Now the criteria and presentation seem to be suffi-
ciently close to our own views so that only minor modifications in
the Department of Commerce format are made here. Even so, we
have found it essential to bring into consideration other highly rele-
vant data, hitherto little used, on the role of multinational banks
and the important part they play in this country's dollar liabilities.
We have in mind both the internal obligations of U.S. parent banks
to their foreign branches and those of the U.S. branches and agen-
cies of foreign banks to their home offices abroad.
Also in Chapter 2 we explore the statistical intricacies of the
Eurodollar market. Since deposits in that market are not claims on
U.S. residents, one may ask if they really need to be taken into
account. We argue that they should be, given the close similarity
in some of the important functions served by the Eurodollar and
the American dollar. We then trace the development of Eurodollar
deposits, by main categories of holders, on the basis of statistics
rather different from those made familiar in the annual reports of
the Bank for International Settlements.
In Chapter 3 we analyze the behavior of foreign dollar holdings
by the three major categories of foreign holders, namely, private
nonbanks, commercial banks and official institutions. We begin
with a brief discussion of the origins of foreign dollar balances,
which includes our own contribution to the controversial literature
on the generation of Eurodollar deposits. In line with the portfolio-
adjustment approach, we have sought to determine the factors that
govern the preference functions of foreign private liquid asset hold-
ers, which in turn., determine the demand for American dollars,
Eurodollars, and other currencies. Within the limits of our data
we examine the sensitivity of foreign nonbank holdings of U.S. dol-
lars, Eurodollars, and foreign currencies to changes in interest rate
differentials corresponding to the three categories of liquid assets.
Our modest results suggest that further analysis may prove reward-
ing, especially, if certain data limitations can be overcome. In this
chapter we also deal with the interrelationships between the opera-
tions of the Eurodollar market and the U.S. balance of payments.
The interrelations between the Eurodollar market and U.S. short-
term capital movements are strong and subject to quantitative mea-Questions to Be Considered 5
surement. But the effects of the market on the U.S. basic balance
can only be conjectured.
In our concluding chapter we summarize our empirical findings
and apply them to certain basic issues relating to the past and pos-
sible future international role of the dollar. Since a substantial por-
tion of the international financial intermediation functions of U.S.
financial markets has been transferred to the Eurocurrency and
Eurobond markets, we explore the implications of the development
of these Euromarkets for the international role of the dollar and for
the U.S. balance of payments. Finally, we apply our empirical and
analytical findings to the problems of international monetary reform
currently under negotiation by the Committee of Twenty. In spite
of the recent dollar crises, we find that the current position and
functions of the dollar may prove difficult, if not impossible, to
replace, and may impose an insurmountable barrier to monetary
authorities seeking to make the dollar symmetrical with other major
currencies in the world payments system.